A Compendium of Tennessee Cons
Office of State Senator Heidi Campbell · Tennessee Senate District 20 Share this →
Tennessee · A Standing Audit Sessions 2021–2026 Compiled 22 August 2026 · Revised 9 September 2026

A Compendium of Tennessee
Cons

Sixteen deals. One pattern. The supermajority keeps handing Tennessee’s roads, water, power, schools, prisons, health dollars and now your personal data to interests that don’t live here, and mailing the bill to the people who do.

Proceeds payable
Elsewhere
Every figure sourced Bill text · Comptroller · Dept. of Revenue · Court filings Receipts at the foot of each entry

The Playbook

Four moves, repeated

The individual fights look unrelated: a highway, a wetland, a hemp shop, a prison. Read them together and the same four steps run through every one, in order.

1

Hand over the asset

A road, a prison, a school seat, a watershed, a fuel cycle, all transferred to a private operator, usually one headquartered somewhere else.

2

Exempt the buyer

Waive the sales tax. Refund the franchise tax. Drop the permit. Cap the liability. Seal the contract as confidential.

3

Take away the local veto

Narrow the county’s power to reject a landfill. Kill the bills that would let a town see a data center’s water use.

4

Bill Tennessee taxpayers

At the toll gantry, the power meter, the pharmacy counter, the grocery register, and in the flood that arrives after the wetland is gone.

Statement of Account

Selected line items
$795M53% of the total

Share of Tennessee’s $1.5 billion franchise‑tax refund flowing to companies headquartered outside the state, per Department of Revenue records.

50 yrsto roughly 2085

Length of the I‑24 toll concession awarded in August 2026 to a Spanish‑led consortium backed by Australian and French capital, which will set and keep the tolls.

$900M~180 jobs on site

State and local package approved for BlueOval City in 2021 against 5,800 promised jobs. Five years on, production has slipped to 2029.

$240Mper year, still paid

What Tennessee pays CoreCivic annually, after fining the company $44.78 million for understaffing since 2022, then approving a raise.

80%of isolated wetlands

Share of Tennessee’s isolated wetlands stripped of state permitting review in 2025: the flood control and water filtration nobody has to build.

$110Mannual budget hole

Projected revenue loss from the THCA ban, which erased roughly three‑quarters of a $250 million market built by Tennessee farmers and small retailers.

2020 → 2025

Growth in data‑center electricity demand on the TVA grid, to 8.3 million MWh, enough to power 661,000 homes, with a pipeline five times larger behind it.

$1.4Bdeclined, every year

Federal health dollars Tennessee turns down annually by refusing Medicaid expansion. These are Tennesseans’ own federal taxes, spent covering people in other states. 300,000+ residents sit in the coverage gap; 19 rural hospitals are at risk of closing.

$1.23Bsigned at $129M

Where Tennessee’s contract with Deloitte for the system that decides who gets TennCare and food assistance now stands, after nine amendments. Total penalties assessed against it since 2016: $59,250.

3 of 7states that did not resist

Tennessee was one of three states that handed its complete voter rolls to the Justice Department voluntarily. The other four jurisdictions asked were sued for refusing. No Tennessean was notified, and none could decline.

The Ledger

16 entries

Each entry records what Tennesseans were told, what was actually signed, who collects, and who carries the risk. Origin codes mark where the proceeds go.

01

The Toll Lanes

The pitch

“Congestion relief without raising the gas tax.”

The deal

The 2023 Transportation Modernization Act put $3.3 billion of cash on the table and, for the first time in state history, authorized public‑private partnerships to build and operate tolled “Choice Lanes.” In August 2026 the state awarded 26 miles of I‑24 between Nashville and Murfreesboro to DriveTN, led by Spain’s Ferrovial and its toll arm Cintra, with Australia’s Transurban and France’s Tikehau Star Infrastructure. The consortium finances the $9.2 billion build. In exchange it sets and collects the tolls for fifty years.

Who pays

Every commuter, at prices the operator adjusts by demand. On comparable Virginia express lanes, peak pricing has reached $4.75 a mile, roughly $40 for a short trip. Texas terminated a concession after tolls climbed more than 160%. Tennessee’s contract runs to about 2085; the people who will pay the highest tolls under it have not been born yet.

02

The Franchise‑Tax Refund

The pitch

“Head off a lawsuit before it costs us more.”

The deal

In 2024 the legislature rewrote the franchise tax and authorized roughly $1.5 billion in refunds plus about $400 million a year in continuing cuts, acting on a letter from corporate attorneys. No court had ruled. Around 60,000 companies collected; some 16,000 took the maximum. The recipient list went up on the Department of Revenue website for exactly thirty days, and never showed what anyone actually received.

Who pays

Department of Revenue analysis obtained by reporters shows 53% of the refund dollars, about $795 million, left the state, even though 81% of eligible businesses are based in Tennessee. The dollars concentrated at the top; the small in‑state firms padded the headcount. In the same sessions, the 4% grocery tax survived intact.

03

The Vouchers

The pitch

“Education freedom for every family.”

The deal

The 2025 Education Freedom Scholarship Act routes about $7,300 per student to private schools: 20,000 seats and $144 million in year one, with half the seats carrying no income limit whatsoever. A 2026 bill doubles it to 40,000 seats and more than $150 million. State officials estimated roughly two‑thirds of recipients were already enrolled in private school, then declined to release the actual number.

Who pays

Public districts lose the funding; families lose the protections. Participating private schools need not administer state tests, employ certified teachers, follow state curriculum, or provide the special‑education services public schools are legally required to deliver. They may turn away students over disability, religion or LGBTQ status. A constitutional challenge was filed in Davidson County Chancery Court in November 2025.

04

CoreCivic

The pitch

“Private operators run prisons more efficiently than the state.”

The deal

Tennessee has levied $44.78 million in understaffing penalties against CoreCivic since 2022: $15.4M at Hardeman County, $12.15M at Whiteville, $10.8M at Trousdale Turner, $6.3M at South Central. It then continued paying the company roughly $240 million a year and approved a $6.8 million increase. Fining a contractor and raising its pay in the same budget cycle is not oversight. It is a subscription.

Who pays

221 people died in CoreCivic‑operated Tennessee prisons between 2019 and 2022, more than a third of all deaths across the state’s 14‑prison system, and over half of its drug‑overdose deaths. Trousdale Turner ran a 33.7% officer vacancy rate against 26% at state‑run facilities, and 146% staff turnover in a single year. The U.S. Justice Department opened a civil rights investigation into conditions there.

05

The Data Centers

The pitch

“World‑class AI investment, at no cost to ratepayers.”

The deal

Tennessee exempts qualified data centers from sales tax on equipment and expanded the break again in 2024. 62 facilities now operate here and 16 more are proposed. In 2026 the legislature considered six bills that would have required registration, permitting, or basic reporting on how much water and power these facilities consume. All six failed. Local governments are left writing their own moratoriums.

In South Memphis, xAI was found to have installed roughly 35 gas turbines while holding a permit for 15, next to a historically Black neighborhood already carrying the region’s worst air burden.

Who pays

Households. Data‑center demand on the TVA grid grew sevenfold between 2020 and 2025, to 8.3 million MWh, the annual consumption of 661,000 homes, with a pipeline five times that already queued. The bills tell the story better than the megawatts do.

Who absorbed the cost Change in average electric bills, 2023–2024, in Tennessee areas hosting data centers
Residential customers
+3.2%
Commercial customers
−0.2%

Source: ThinkTennessee, Powering Growth, July 2026. Bars show magnitude of change; residential rose, commercial fell.

06

The Wetlands

The pitch

“Property rights, and cheaper housing.”

The deal

After Sackett v. EPA stripped federal protection from isolated wetlands in 2023, Tennessee had the option to keep its own. Instead the 2025 legislature removed state permitting for most of what remained: artificial wetlands, no permit; low‑quality isolated wetlands up to one acre, no permit and no mitigation; moderate‑quality up to a quarter acre, the same. The law also bars the state from weighing cumulative impact, so a thousand quarter‑acre losses legally add up to nothing.

Who pays

The Southern Environmental Law Center estimates the law removes review from up to 80% of Tennessee’s isolated wetlands; 94% of them sit under two acres. Northwest Tennessee alone holds more than 30,000 acres. Wetlands are flood control and water filtration that no county has to fund, staff, or bond for. Until they’re gone, and it has to.

07

The Nuclear Campus

The pitch

“Tennessee will lead America’s nuclear revival.”

The deal

The state stood up a $60 million Nuclear Energy Fund and wrote checks from it. Orano, the French state‑controlled nuclear fuel company, took $5 million from the fund, a $6 million economic development grant, and $5 million more on contingency, then received a full state and local sales‑tax waiver on its $4.5 billion Oak Ridge enrichment plant. The Fiscal Review Office could not calculate what that waiver costs Tennessee. Nobody made them.

The governor requested $92.6 million more, including $50 million toward a TVA reactor. Tennessee is now a top‑five finalist for a federal “Nuclear Lifecycle Campus”: a promised $50 billion and 25,000 jobs in exchange for consolidating the nation’s spent nuclear fuel, with no site named and no disposal path guaranteed.

Who pays

Whichever county draws it, and every county downstream and downwind. As the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy put it, the site “will become a high‑level radioactive waste dump, and this waste will likely never leave.” A legislative resolution volunteering Tennessee for the program moved with almost no public debate before it was pulled.

08

The Hemp Ban

The pitch

“Protecting kids from unregulated intoxicants.”

The deal

Age limits and potency caps were available. Instead the state moved hemp licensing to the Alcoholic Beverage Commission and banned THCA outright effective July 2026, roughly three‑quarters of a $250 million Tennessee market built almost entirely by in‑state farmers, wholesalers and small retailers.

Who pays

Tennessee shop owners, who describe being legislated out of business, and Tennessee farmers who planted for a legal crop. And the treasury: July 2026 hemp wholesale collections came in at $425,000 against a $9.4 million projection, better than a 95% collapse in a single month, on pace to open a $110 million annual hole. The state had already cut the prior year’s hemp revenue estimate by $55 million.

09

Cannabis Reform, Refused

The pitch

“We need a more comprehensive approach.” Said every session since 2015.

The deal

63% of Tennessee voters support legal adult use (Vanderbilt Poll, December 2024). Tennessee is one of only eight states in the country with no medical cannabis program at all. A 2026 home‑grow bill died 4–3 in Senate committee, with four Republicans voting no and two more abstaining rather than going on record. A separate bill moved rescheduling authority away from medical experts and gave it to the legislature itself.

Who pays

Patients with chronic pain, epilepsy, PTSD and cancer, who either drive to another state or buy from someone with no license and no lab. Tennessee just deleted its only legal cannabinoid market and declined, in the same year, to build a lawful one to replace it. The practical effect is to keep the market illegal for another year.

10

The Monsanto Shield

The pitch

“Frivolous lawsuits threaten our farmers.”

The deal

SB0527 would bar failure‑to‑warn claims against pesticide manufacturers whose labels carry EPA approval, meaning a company could know of a cancer risk, keep it off the label the EPA rubber‑stamped, and be immune in Tennessee court. Bayer, which bought Monsanto and with it Roundup, has run near‑identical bills in 17 states. Tennessee’s was deferred to 2026 rather than defeated. It is still alive.

Who pays

More than 300 Tennesseans have sued over Roundup exposure; about 100 more over paraquat. Nationally there are 170,000+ claims; Bayer paid over $10 billion to settle roughly 100,000 of them in 2020, and a Georgia jury returned a $2 billion verdict. The bill adds nothing to the safety of a single Tennessee farmer, and it would leave their claims worthless.

11

The Landfills

The pitch

“Local red tape is a bottleneck for capacity.”

The deal

The Jackson Law, on the books since the 1980s, lets a county or city vote to approve or reject a commercial landfill in its borders. 54 counties and 18 cities have adopted it. A state solid waste task force is now weighing how to narrow it, with the National Waste and Recycling Association and the Tennessee Chamber arguing that permitting should be “more regional” with fewer layers of local approval. “Regional” means the county you are dumping in no longer gets a vote.

Meanwhile the Tennessee Waste to Jobs Act, which would make packaging producers rather than county property taxpayers fund recycling infrastructure and exempts any business under $10 million, has stalled two sessions running.

Who pays

Rural counties, which have neither the staff nor the outside counsel to outlast a national waste company, and for whom the local vote is the only leverage that exists. Middle Tennessee’s landfills are approaching capacity; the pressure to site the next one somewhere with less money and fewer lawyers is already here.

12

The Pharma Dark Money

The pitch

“Fighting high drug prices.”

The deal

When Tennessee moved in 2026 to regulate pharmacy benefit managers, the middlemen squeezing independent pharmacies out of business, a group calling itself Shaping Healthy Initiatives for Tomorrow ran nearly $500,000 in television advertising against the bill. It is registered to a post office box in Oklahoma, linked to other political organizations, with no identifiable company behind it. Its ads praised three senators by name for “fighting” drug prices by opposing the drug‑pricing bill.

Who pays

The bill passed anyway, and CVS said it would sue. Keep the outcome in mind, and then note what it took to get there. Half a million dollars of untraceable out‑of‑state money can be aimed at a Tennessee bill, run on Tennessee television, and nobody has to sign their name to it. That is the vulnerability. This time the bill survived it.

13

The Incentive Machine

The pitch

“Cash for jobs.”

The deal

Since 2016 the state has had to chase 71 companies that collected $169 million in FastTrack grants, promised more than 24,000 jobs, and produced about 7,400. More than $20 million is still outstanding; a 2024 audit wrote off $7.9 million as uncollectible. One firm took $3 million, created zero jobs, and its owners pleaded guilty to wire fraud.

Tennessee’s development agreements, including Ford’s, are confidential by statute. The Comptroller has found that the job numbers companies self‑report “simply are not reliable.” The state does not verify what it buys, and the public is not allowed to read the contract.

Who pays

The clearest case is the largest. In 2021 the legislature approved a $900 million package for BlueOval City against 5,800 promised jobs.

BlueOval City, five years in Jobs promised in the 2021 incentive package vs. people on site as of July 2026
Promised by 2032
5,800
On site today
~180

Source: Tennessee Lookout, 23 July 2026. EV truck production was cancelled; the line is now scheduled for gas trucks in 2029. A $675 million clawback triggers only if the count is still short in 2032.

14

The Coverage Gap

The pitch

“We won’t take Washington’s money and its strings.”

The deal

This is the largest number in this entire ledger, and it is a refusal. Every year since 2014, Tennessee has declined roughly $1.4 billion in federal Medicaid expansion funds, plus a one‑time $900 million signing incentive Congress offered in 2021 to states that had held out. Thirteen years of that is a figure with a b in front of it that nobody in the Capitol wants totaled on a whiteboard.

Understand what “Washington’s money” means: it is Tennesseans’ own federal taxes. They are collected here and spent covering people in California, New York and Ohio. Tennessee pays in and opts out.

Who pays

More than 300,000 Tennesseans sit in the coverage gap, earning too much for TennCare and too little for a marketplace subsidy. There is no plan for them and never was one.

And the hospitals that treat them anyway. Tennessee has the highest rate of hospital closures per capita in the country. As of August 2026, 19 rural hospitals, 36% of the state’s total, are at risk of closing, 12 of them immediately. When a rural hospital closes, the county loses its largest employer and its labor and delivery unit in the same week, and the ambulance ride to the next town becomes the difference between a stroke you survive and one you don’t.

15

The Eligibility Machine

The pitch

“Modern technology will get benefits to people faster and stop fraud.”

The deal

In October 2016 Tennessee contracted with Deloitte Consulting, LLP to build and operate TEDS, the system that determines who qualifies for TennCare and for food assistance. The award was competitive, by Request for Qualification. The maximum liability was $129,130,065.06.

Nine amendments later the maximum liability is $1,233,569,422.52. Amendment 9 was signed on 31 August 2026 and runs the contract to September 2027. Two further Deloitte contracts run alongside it: integration services at $75,508,315.16, and Edison 75715 at $10,014,819.25. The three together commit Tennessee to roughly $1.32 billion. Every figure here is taken from the executed amendments and the Department’s filings with the Fiscal Review Committee.

Nine amendments Maximum liability of Edison contract 51758 after each amendment, as stated in the executed amendments
Original, October 2016
$129.1M
After Amendment 2, 2019
$272.1M
After Amendment 4
$532.0M
After Amendment 6
$823.1M
After Amendment 7, 2024
$971.2M
After Amendment 8, Aug 2025
$1.12B
After Amendment 9, Aug 2026
$1.23B

Source: executed amendments to contract 51758, provided by the Fiscal Review Committee, 2019 through 2026. The $823 million figure reported nationally was the liability before Amendment 7. Amendments 8 and 9, signed in August 2025 and August 2026, carried it past a billion dollars.

Who pays

Tennesseans who qualify and lose coverage anyway. On 26 August 2024, in A.M.C. v. Smith, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee held that the state’s eligibility determination process violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and the due process clause. The defendant was TennCare, not the vendor. The opinion runs to 116 pages and concludes that keeping Medicaid coverage “should not require luck, perseverance, and zealous lawyering.”

The penalties

The Department keeps a sanctions record for this contract. It lists twelve liquidated damages assessed since 2016, totalling $59,250. Against a contract of $1.23 billion that is 0.0048 percent, or roughly five cents for every thousand dollars committed.

They are small individually as well as in total. The largest is $19,000, for system uptime and compliance failures in March 2024. Four are $1,000 apiece. Contract Attachment 2 caps the penalty for any performance failure not itemised in its table at $1,000, whatever the failure and whatever the size of the contract.

Assessments did continue after the federal judgment: $42,000 was recouped after 26 August 2024, including for service level failures in October 2025 and January 2026. The question is not whether the state uses this remedy. It is whether a remedy measured in thousands is a remedy at all on a contract measured in billions.

The ceiling

The contract sets a separate cap on what Deloitte can be paid for change orders without a formal amendment. In 2019 that cap was $103,609,814.21. Amendment 8 raised it to $556,500,514.96. Amendment 9 raised it again to $606,480,369.32, close to six times the original and roughly half the value of the whole contract.

Whose money

Roughly 86 cents of every dollar is federal: as of the 2019 amendment the split was $233,893,610.32 federal against $38,236,454.74 state. That is not a defence, and Tennesseans should not hear it as one. Federal dollars are dollars Tennesseans send to Washington and Washington sends back, and a state paying fourteen cents of each one has fourteen cents of reason to read the invoice closely.

Set it beside entry 14. Tennessee declines $1.4 billion a year in federal money to cover 300,000 uninsured residents, and draws down federal money without apparent difficulty to pay a technology contract that has grown sixfold.

And Equifax

The income check is a separate contract. In September 2022 TennCare filed for approval of a contract with Equifax Workforce Solutions LLC, recorded as a Sole Source, Non‑Competitive Contract: $9,971,332.00 over a three‑year base, $18,131,558.96 with all renewal options exercised. The Department explained why no competition was possible:

“There is no other provider who offers automated, instant access to the employer payroll records available on The Work Number. Employers who send records to Equifax use this service exclusively.”

The same filing records that The Work Number holds contracts with 44 states and covers more than 37 percent of the American workforce. In February 2026 Senators Warren, Wyden and Sanders opened an inquiry into its pricing, citing four‑year increases of 126 percent in Colorado, 120 percent in Kansas, 95 percent in North Carolina and 69 percent in Connecticut.

What happens next

The Department has said for some time that it intends to rebid this work. Its published schedule lists the Tennessee Eligibility Platform (31865‑00648), covering “data collection, application registration, eligibility determination and appeals,” and Social Service Employment and Income Verification Services (RFP 31865‑00667), covering the income check now performed under the sole‑source Equifax contract.

Neither has been released. TennCare told Fiscal Review staff in August 2026 that the release date for the eligibility platform is uncertain, that it was working through concerns raised by the Comptroller, and that it anticipated a release sometime in calendar year 2026.

On 31 August 2026, while that rebid remained unreleased, the state signed Amendment 9. It extends the incumbent to September 2027 and raises the ceiling to $1.23 billion. The competitive procurement has been coming for years. The extensions arrive on schedule.

And the maze

Every added requirement is another place an eligible person can fall out. Tennessee’s expanded SNAP work rules took effect in September 2025 with no transition period: the age ceiling rose from 54 to 65, the parental exemption narrowed from children under 18 to children under 14, and veterans, aged‑out foster youth and homeless Tennesseans must now file employment and volunteer logs to keep eating.

16

The Voter File

The pitch

“Protecting the vote and keeping the rolls clean.”

The deal

In December 2025 Tennessee handed its complete voter registration lists to the U.S. Department of Justice. Tennessee was one of only three states that complied voluntarily, along with Louisiana and Mississippi, while the Department went to court against Georgia, Illinois, Wisconsin and the District of Columbia, which refused.

No Tennessean was notified, and no Tennessean could decline. Registering to vote was the consent. The state has not published which data fields it transferred, how long the Department may keep them, or which other federal agencies may receive them. Tennessee voter registration collects driver’s license numbers and partial Social Security numbers.

Who pays

Every registered voter in this state. Your name, date of birth and home address now sit in a federal database because an official you elected sent them there without telling you, and there is no published limit on how long they stay or where they go next.

For most people that is an abstraction. For some it is not. Survivors of domestic violence, police officers, judges, and anyone who has moved house to get away from somebody had their address forwarded without a word, and cannot ask for it back.

The other half

What the public file does not contain is now being collected too. VoteSafe.org, which is run by Elon Musk’s America PAC and not by any government, presents itself as a registration check and takes name, date of birth, home address, phone number, email, IP address, device and browsing history, party affiliation, voting method and “political interests.” On 29 August 2026 its privacy policy was revised to permit sharing or selling that information to “business partners,” including inferences about “psychological trends, predispositions, behavior, attitudes, intelligence, abilities and aptitude.” America PAC spent more than $180,000 promoting it on Meta in a single week.

Checking your registration is a good idea. Do it at Tennessee’s own voter lookup or at vote.gov, which perform the same check and collect none of that.

Follow the Flag

Where the proceeds sit

Foreign and out‑of‑state investment is not itself a scandal. Tennessee has courted it since Nissan came to Smyrna in 1980. What has changed is the terms: who carries the risk, who sets the price, and who is allowed to read the contract.

ES Ferrovial / Cintra Leads the consortium that will price and collect I‑24 tolls until roughly 2085.
AU Transurban Managed‑lanes operator; runs the dynamic‑pricing express lanes model in Virginia.
FR Tikehau · Orano French infrastructure capital in the toll deal; French state‑controlled Orano in Oak Ridge, tax‑exempt.
DE Bayer AG Running a 17‑state campaign to bar failure‑to‑warn claims. Tennessee’s bill is deferred, not dead.
KR SK On · Hankook Sole owner of the BlueOval battery plant; and among the largest franchise‑tax refund recipients.
JP Nissan Six subsidiaries collected the maximum franchise‑tax break.
US Out of state Amazon, AT&T, 84 Lumber, Ford, xAI, Google, Meta, CoreCivic’s shareholders, Deloitte, Equifax, America PAC, AFP, AFC, the Pacific Legal Foundation, the NWRA, and one Oklahoma P.O. box.

What They Would Not Do

The other half of the ledger

A budget is a statement of priorities, and so is a calendar. These are the things the supermajority has had the votes to do for years, and has not done.

Fair Notes

Stated plainly

Any argument worth making has to survive the strongest reply to it. Here are the honest qualifications, so nobody can hand them to you as a surprise:

  • On the toll lanes: money flows toward Tennessee at signing, not away. DriveTN bid a $24.8 billion concession value with $1.5 billion at financial close and privately finances the $9.2 billion build. The cost to Tennesseans is the fifty years of tolls that follow, at prices the operator sets, and the existing free lanes stay free.
  • On the PBM bill: it passed over the dark‑money campaign. The failure named here is disclosure law, not the outcome.
  • On the franchise tax: supporters argue the refunds headed off a constitutional challenge that could have cost more. No court ever ruled, and the legislature acted on a letter from corporate counsel.
  • On BlueOval City: it is still under construction, Ford still carries a $675 million clawback obligation, and the 2032 deadline has not arrived. The criticism is the secrecy of the terms and the absence of interim accountability, rather than any certainty that the plant will fail.
  • On the nuclear campus: no site has been selected and no agreement signed. The objection is to volunteering the state for permanent spent‑fuel storage through a resolution that moved with almost no public debate.
  • On Medicaid expansion: opponents argue the state’s 10% match is a permanent obligation on a federal promise Congress could cut, and that TennCare already runs a waiver. Both points are real. Neither explains thirteen years without an alternative for the 300,000 people in the gap.
  • On the eligibility contracts: the figures come from the Department’s own filings and are quoted as they appear there. Three qualifications belong with them. The 2016 award to Deloitte was competitive, by Request for Qualification, and nothing here suggests otherwise. The court in A.M.C. v. Smith ruled against TennCare, not against either vendor: the state was the defendant, because the state is responsible for the system it buys and for the remedies it chooses not to seek. And most of the money is federal, so Tennessee’s direct share of these contracts is roughly fourteen percent of the totals shown. The Department does use the liquidated damages remedy, including after the 2024 judgment; the criticism here is the scale of it, not its absence. The Department is also preparing to rebid both the eligibility platform and the income verification contract, which is the remedy this entry argues for.
  • On the voter file: Tennessee’s basic voter roll is already a public record that campaigns, researchers and journalists can purchase, and the Justice Department asserts statutory authority for its request. What is new here is the transfer of the entire file to a federal agency with no published limit on retention or downstream sharing, no notice to voters and no way to opt out, plus the state’s silence on whether license and partial Social Security numbers went with it.
  • On vouchers and wetlands: both were passed by recorded votes in open session by legislators who ran on doing exactly this. That is the system working. Whether it is working for Tennesseans is the question this ledger puts on the table.

Receipts

Full source list

Send It On

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